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ABSTRACT—The doctrine of command responsibility posits that, when 
military commanders fail to effectively prevent, suppress, or punish their 
subordinates’ war crimes, the commander may be punished for the 
subordinates’ crimes. Several international criminal statutes have codified 
this doctrine, but the United States’ Uniform Code of Military Justice has 
not. In light of U.S. law-of-war violations during the Iraq and Afghanistan 
wars, several legal commentators have called for stronger legal incentives 
within domestic military law and for the adoption of a formal command 
responsibility provision. Such measures, it is argued, would place sufficient 
pressure on senior military commanders to stem the tide of war crimes 
within the U.S. military. Assuming that a formal command responsibility 
statute is the best method of redress, this Note argues that a more nuanced 
approach is needed to introduce the provision domestically. Namely, 
Congress must shape the provision around the concerns and incentives of 
small-unit leaders, not senior military commanders. As the United States 
continues to engage heavily in counterinsurgency warfare, small-unit 
leaders have taken on increasingly more important roles, both strategically 
and with regard to preventing law-of-war violations. Accordingly, there is a 
critical need for lawmakers to draft the statutory elements of a command 
responsibility so as to minimize the doctrine’s costs on small-unit leaders 
while maximizing these leaders’ incentives to enforce the laws of war. 
Using this framework, this Note argues further that a domestic command 
responsibility provision should incorporate a negligence mens rea standard 
in only limited circumstances.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the military, commanders1 have tremendous authority over their 
subordinates. A superior may require a subordinate to conduct physical 
exercises as corrective training to the point of utter exhaustion.2 In combat, 
a commander may order a subordinate to assault a fortified enemy position 
in the face of heavy resistance. In either situation, the subordinate often has 
little choice but to accept his orders as a matter of duty.3 
The price for such authority is what many refer to as the burden of 
command.4 Commanders are expected to complete every assigned mission 
while simultaneously being entrusted with their subordinates’ lives, 
training, equipment, discipline, fitness, and overall well-being.5 
 
1 Although the term commander has a specific meaning within the U.S. military, this Note uses the 
term to refer to any military leader that has direct authority over one or more soldiers. It is used 
interchangeably with the terms “superior” and “leader.” 
2 The concept is called “smoking.” Although highly discouraged by senior military leaders, it is a 
common form of corrective training. See Lewis Wald, Corrective Training: Every Unit Commander 
Should Know, Follow Three Golden Rules, FORT HOOD SENTINEL (Sept. 2, 2010), 
http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/story.php?id=4723. 
3 See ALFRED TENNYSON, Charge of the Light Brigade, in SELECTED POEMS 52, 52 (Stanley 
Applebaum ed., Dover Publ’ns 1992) (“Theirs not to make reply, / Theirs not to reason why, / Theirs 
but to do and die. / Into the valley of Death / Rode the six hundred.”). 
4 See, e.g., THE LAST CASTLE (DreamWorks Pictures 2001) (using the phrase “burden of 
command” in this context). 
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 6-22, ARMY LEADERSHIP para. 2-10 (12 Oct. 2006) 
[hereinafter FM 6-22]. 
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Furthermore, a commander’s responsibility exists regardless of whether the 
subordinate is on-duty or off-duty, in the field or in the barracks, or 
deployed overseas or stationed at home.6 In short, commanders are 
“responsible for all that the unit does or fails to do.”7 
This maxim raises an interesting question: to what extent are 
commanders criminally responsible for the illegal actions of their 
subordinates? Consider the following three scenarios. First, Commander A 
in Iraq is compelled to release a detainee he strongly suspects killed one of 
his soldiers. He orders his lieutenant to transport the man to a nearby 
village and to “take care of him” along the way. Reading between the lines, 
the lieutenant executes the detainee in the desert.8 Second, a sergeant 
watches one of his fellow soldiers become severely injured during an attack 
in Afghanistan. Over the next week, he openly complains in front of 
Commander B that the unit should retaliate for the attack. Soon after, the 
sergeant slips off base in the early morning and kills several civilians.9 
Third, a group of soldiers carry out a plan to kill an unarmed Afghan 
teenager and make it look like an act of self-defense. Despite convincing 
evidence to the contrary, Commander C accepts their version of events and 
halts any further inquiry.10 What punishment, if any, could each 
commander face under the current military justice system? 
Commander A’s criminal liability has long been established under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).11 Under Article 77, any military 
leader that “counsels, commands, or procures” the commission of a crime 
is punishable as if he committed the crime himself.12 The provision is 
similar to the notion of complicity, because it translates a commander’s 
active participation in the crime into actual commission.13 Here, because 
 
6 Id. para. 2-11. 
7 KEITH E. BONN, ARMY OFFICER’S GUIDE 314 (50th ed. 2005). 
8 This hypothetical is based loosely on an event that occurred near Baiji, Iraq in April 2008. See Joe 
Mozingo, A Killing in the Desert: Two Gunshots and Many Questions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at 
A1. 
9 This hypothetical is based on the killings carried out by Staff Sergeant Robert Bales. See Michael 
Evans, How a Bearded US Sergeant Slipped Out to Commit an Afghan Massacre, AUSTRALIAN (Mar. 
13, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/how-a-bearded-us-sergeant-slipped-
out-to-commit-an-afghan-massacre/story-fnb64oi6-1226298022670. 
10 This hypothetical is based on the Kill Team murders. See Mark Boal, The Kill Team: How U.S. 
Soldiers in Afghanistan Murdered Innocent Civilians and Mutilated Their Corpses, ROLLING STONE, 
Apr. 14, 2011, at 56, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-kill-team-20110327. 
11 The UCMJ, which is codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, sets out military law that “govern[s] 
the Army as a separate community, to include the procedural and substantive rules governing the 
conduct of members of the armed forces.” John M. Hackel, Planning for the “Strategic Case”: A 
Proposal to Align the Handling of Marine Corps War Crimes Prosecutions with Counterinsurgency 
Doctrine, 57 NAVAL L. REV. 239, 246 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12 10 U.S.C. § 877 (2012). 
13 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985); see also 
Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of Subordinates—The 
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Commander A’s take care instruction is a tacit order to kill the detainee, he 
would be liable for murder.14 
Commanders B and C also face the prospect of punishment, even 
though they have not actively participated in their subordinates’ crimes. In 
these cases, their culpability depends on the doctrine of command 
responsibility. In general, the doctrine states that commanders have a duty 
to prevent, suppress, and punish their subordinates’ war crimes.15 If they 
fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures to carry out these duties, 
they may be punished.16 In B’s case, his culpability results from a failure to 
prevent the enraged sergeant from killing civilians, whereas C’s culpability 
stems from his failure to punish his subordinates for the staged killing. 
The doctrine of command responsibility has been recognized within 
the United States military since the aftermath of the Second World War. 
American military jurists first applied it to belligerent military leaders 
during the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials.17 In 1956, the U.S. Army 
incorporated command responsibility within its own military dogma with 
the release of its manual on the law of land warfare.18 By including 
command responsibility within the manual, the U.S. Army established the 
doctrine as a guiding principle for future commanders. 
Despite such recognition, however, the United States has never 
codified the doctrine within the UCMJ. As such, the U.S. military does not 
have a criminal command responsibility statute applicable to its own 
leaders. So although the doctrine serves as a touchstone for military 
discipline, it does not serve a direct basis for criminal culpability. 
Under the current military justice system, leaders who fail to 
adequately prevent or punish violations of the law of war are disciplined 
instead under the general category of command failures. Stated differently, 
these failures are generally punished in the same manner as all other types 
of command failures. In many instances, a commander’s failure—including 
one that involves a violation of the law of war—is handled through 
administrative or other nonjudicial means.19 In more serious cases, a 
commander may be charged with criminal dereliction of duty under Article 
92 of the UCMJ. 
 
Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues in United States Law, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 
279 (1997) (“The guilt of the superior-accomplice is premised on the commission of a crime by a 
subordinate-principal.”). 
14 See, e.g., CHANTAL MELONI, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 2 
(2010). 
15 Id. at 3. 
16 Id. 
17 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274–76.  
18 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 501 (18 
July 1956) [hereinafter FM 27-10]. 
19 See Victor Hansen, Creating and Improving Legal Incentives for Law of War Compliance, 
42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 247, 257 (2008). 
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Although rare, a commander may face the prospect of more severe 
punishment than criminal dereliction of duty. In at least one instance in 
U.S. history, military prosecutors applied Article 77 against a commander 
who failed to prevent his subordinates from committing a mass atrocity.20 
Consequently, there is also precedent to invoke the UCMJ’s complicity 
provision when prosecuting command responsibility failures under the 
current military justice system. 
Despite the flexibility it offers in punishing leaders who fail to prevent 
or appropriately punish subordinate war crimes, this legal framework has 
received scant support from legal scholars. Many believe these tools fail to 
create an effective system for enforcing the law of war within the 
military.21 Drawing on their concerns, two military lawyers have sought to 
codify the doctrine within the UCMJ.22 By drafting a provision that mirrors 
the international standard of command responsibility, they argue, the U.S. 
military will be better able to prevent the next My Lai, Abu Ghraib, or 
Haditha.23 
Assuming that military leaders need more accountability over their 
subordinates’ law-of-war violations, and adopting a command 
responsibility provision is the best method for achieving this result,24 the 
proposals offered by these two practitioners would fail to create an 
effective preventative regime within the United States. In line with the 
 
20 See Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7 (1972) 
(discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina, and 
Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 155, 192–
200 (2000) (same). 
21 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248; Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command 
Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 639 (2007); 
William C. Peters, Adjudication Deferred: Command Responsibility for War Crimes and US Military 
Justice from My Lai to Haditha and Beyond, 37 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 926, 927 (2009); Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and International Law, 30 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 251, 258–60 (2009). 
22 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266–70; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19. 
23 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19. For more information on 
the My Lai incident, see infra Part II.B.2. The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal occurred in 2003 and 
involved U.S. intelligence soldiers physically, psychologically, and sexually abusing Iraqi prisoners. 
See generally SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 
(2004) (discussing both the torture occurring at Abu Ghraib and the resulting scandal). The Haditha 
incident occurred in 2005 and involved a Marine unit killing at least twenty-four civilian 
noncombatants. Initially, the Marine Corps claimed the civilians had been accidently killed in a 
roadside bombing and failed to investigate the incident. See Peters, supra note 21, at 940. 
24 Some scholars argue that procedural changes to the current military justice system are a better 
avenue for addressing command responsibility issues than substantive alterations. See Jason Sengheiser, 
Command Responsibility for Omissions and Detainee Abuse in the “War on Terror,” 30 T. JEFFERSON 
L. REV. 693, 719 (2008) (calling for independent prosecutors to handle command responsibility cases); 
James W. Smith III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the 
Military Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671, 701–08 (2006) (proposing procedure changes to 
court martial system). Another alternative solution is simply to improve training standards throughout 
the military regarding the laws of war, especially among junior leaders. See infra note 236. 
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prevailing opinion on command responsibility, these proposals seek to hold 
leaders at the highest levels of authority responsible for law-of-war 
violations.25 To accomplish this feat, a statute must establish a low bar for 
liability (i.e., a low standard for mens rea and causation) because it is often 
difficult to connect senior leaders to a war crime.26 This low threshold, 
however, yields an unintended secondary effect: it establishes a near-strict 
liability regime for small-unit commanders27 who have a closer connection 
with subordinate-offenders. The consequences of this effect are significant. 
As the U.S. has shifted toward a counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare model, 
small-unit leaders have taken on increasingly more complex and 
strategically vital roles. In current military operations, they are often 
entrusted with broad authority to operate in their own battle spaces and are 
crucial to mission success and preventing law-of-war abuses.28 
Given the importance of small-unit commanders, there is a need to 
reevaluate how command responsibility should be adopted within the 
UCMJ. If Congress is to draft a formal criminal provision, it must do so in 
a manner that gives greater weight to the concerns of small-unit leaders. 
Essentially, the legislature should formulate the statutory elements of a 
command responsibility statute by considering their costs and benefits on 
junior military leaders. 
Relying on this new framework, this Note will address one of the more 
difficult questions of command responsibility: whether the doctrine should 
encompass a negligence standard.29 Current proposals for formally 
adopting command responsibility within the U.S. generally embrace a 
 
25 Legal scholars exploring the issue of command responsibility often seek to assign responsibility 
to senior military leaders. See Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 156–59 (2005) (focusing on senior leadership in Abu Ghraib); Victor Hansen, 
What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander—Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United 
States to Adopt a Standard of Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 397–
400 (2007); Martinez, supra note 21, at 639 (finding that “generals and presidents [often] bear a greater 
share of moral responsibility” in command responsibility cases); MELONI, supra note 14, at 27–31 
(discussing the need to establish responsibility for top leaders); Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 697 (“For 
the doctrine of command responsibility to reduce violations of the laws of war, it must seek to assign 
responsibility up the chain of command.”); Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 276–79 (focusing on 
prosecution of high-ranking commanders in Haditha incident). 
26 See Martinez, supra note 21, at 639 (stating that “hard proof of the connection between the 
generals and the crimes committed by their foot soldiers is often extremely difficult to find”); Wu & 
Kang, supra note 13, at 272 (“The further away a superior is from the actual ‘smoking gun,’ however, 
the more difficult he is to prosecute.”).  
27 The term “small-unit commander” refers to military leaders who serve in tactical (i.e., ground-
level) leadership positions. Namely, it encompasses sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.  
28 See MARK MOYAR, A QUESTION OF COMMAND: COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM THE CIVIL WAR 
TO IRAQ 236–37 (2009) (illustrating broad scope of one small-unit leader’s authority during COIN 
operations in Iraq). 
29 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 285–86.  
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negligence requirement.30 When considering the effects of this standard on 
small-unit leaders, however, it becomes apparent that negligence should 
only be used in limited circumstances. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I explores a brief history of 
command responsibility, reveals the doctrine’s core elements, and 
identifies its most controversial components. To best illustrate the current 
state of command responsibility within the United States, Part II draws on 
two recent law-of-war violations committed by American soldiers: the Kill 
Team incidents and the Staff Sergeant Robert Bales massacre. These 
incidents help illustrate the methods for punishing command failures under 
the current military justice system. Part III then discusses the criticism of 
this system and introduces two proposals for codifying command 
responsibility within the UCMJ. After outlining these schemes, Part IV 
identifies their shortcomings and addresses the need for a small-unit 
commander approach by considering the central tenets of COIN warfare. 
Having shown the necessity for a small-unit leader approach, Part V 
analyzes the effectiveness of maintaining a negligence standard within 
command responsibility. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
Although command responsibility dates back to the early fifteenth 
century,31 it is best understood in the context of its modern history. The 
current doctrine is essentially the product of developments made in the law 
of armed conflict in the 1940s.32 Toward the end of the Second World War, 
the United States and its allies sought to hold several high-ranking German 
and Japanese officers accountable for a number of atrocities committed by 
their soldiers. In many of these cases, though, there was little direct 
evidence that these leaders ordered or actively participated in the abuses.33 
Consequently, the Allies needed an indirect theory of liability—one that 
criminalizes leaders for failing to exercise their power of control.34 
Stated simply, command responsibility posits that, under certain 
circumstances, a commander may be criminally culpable for a war crime 
committed within his ranks.35 This responsibility stems from a breach of 
two related duties. In general, a commander has a duty to maintain 
discipline and order within his unit. As part of this duty, he has the 
 
30 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 269; Smidt, supra note 20, at 169. But see Sengheiser, supra note 
24, at 698 (proposing a recklessness standard).  
31 See MELONI, supra note 14, at 3 (“A significant forerunner of the doctrine . . . was contained in 
the Ordinance issued in 1439 by Charles VII d’Orleans . . . .”). 
32 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. (claiming there was a need “for a legal doctrine through which superiors could be held liable 
for the same substantive crimes as their subordinates”). 
35 See, e.g., MELONI, supra note 14, at 3. 
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obligation to prevent his subordinates from violating the laws of war.36 If 
the commander fails in these duties, his omission translates into criminal 
culpability. 
The theory does not hold leaders strictly liable.37 Commanders are not 
held responsible simply because they assumed a position of command.38 
Instead, they must be connected to the war crime in two ways. First, there 
must be a causal relationship between the commander’s omission and the 
misconduct. Second, “the commander must have had the opportunity and 
ability to prevent the crime.”39 In other words, he must have the power to 
stop it. 
The United States laid much of the groundwork for the doctrine during 
the trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita.40 Yamashita was the Japanese 
commander of the Philippines during the U.S. invasion of the islands in the 
spring of 1945. After several months of hard fighting, the American 
advance started to gain momentum and forced the Japanese to fall back. In 
the midst of their retreat, Japanese soldiers executed thousands of Filipino 
citizens and American prisoners of war.41 After the islands fell, the U.S. 
subsequently charged Yamashita with “unlawfully disregard[ing] and 
fail[ing] to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of 
the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities 
and other high crimes . . . .”42 
Despite a lack of evidence that Yamashita had personally ordered 
these acts or even knew about them, he was convicted under a command 
responsibility theory by a military commission.43 Yamashita claimed that 
because the United States had effectively cut his lines of communication, it 
was impossible for him to know what was happening, or, even if he had 
known, he could not have ordered his soldiers to stop.44 The commission 
believed, however, that the crimes were so “extensive and widespread, both 
as to time and area, that they must either have been willfully permitted by 
 
36 Id. (stating that a superior’s criminality consists of his “failure to exercise control properly over 
his subordinates and to take the necessary measures for the purpose of preventing their crimes or 
punishing them”). 
37 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 281 (stating that strict liability “is an inapposite analogy to 
command responsibility”). 
38 See Smidt, supra note 20, at 182–83 (discussing the German High Command Case). 
39 William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard, 
97 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982). 
40 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 274–75. To be sure, there are a number of important cases 
during this era that helped lay the groundwork for command responsibility, including the German High 
Command Case and the Hostage Cases. The trial of Yamashita, though, is the most famous. Id. at 274.  
41 Id. 
42 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
43 Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 275. 
44 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 53–54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  
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[Yamashita], or secretly ordered by” him.45 In convicting Yamashita, the 
commission set two important precedents. First, it confirmed a 
commander’s legal duty to control his subordinates and prevent abuses.46 
Second, it established two elements of culpability: a commander must have 
“some degree of knowledge” about the crimes and the opportunity to 
prevent them.47 In doing so, it carved out mens rea and actus reus elements. 
Although Yamashita helped lay the groundwork for command 
responsibility, the doctrine suffered from two major issues in the postwar 
era. First, Yamashita (along with other war crimes trials) left several 
questions unanswered. Namely, it failed to define the extent of a 
commander’s duty, what steps a commander must take to fulfill his duty, 
the appropriate level of mens rea, and the role of causation.48 Furthermore, 
the doctrine lacked widespread acceptance immediately following the war. 
Several jurists complained that the doctrine was simply an exercise of 
“victor’s justice.”49 
In an effort to address these concerns, the international community has 
codified command responsibility in several accords over the past fifty 
years. The doctrine appears in Protocol I to the Geneva Convention 
(Protocol I),50 the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR),51 and the Rome Statute of 
 
45 Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 275 (citing 4 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, LAW 
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 34 (1948)). 
46 Smidt, supra note 20, at 180–81. 
47 Id. at 181. Smidt points out that there are several interpretations of what level of mens rea was 
used to convict Yamashita. One possibility is that he had actual knowledge of the crimes and secretly 
ordered them. Another is that he must have known of the crimes and did not stop them. Id. 
48 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 295 (discussing scope of commander’s duty); id. at 295–97 
(discussing limits on feasibility); id. at 278–79 (discussing mens rea); id. at 288–90 (discussing 
causation). 
49 Arthur T. O’Reilly, Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign the Doctrine with Principles of 
Individual Accountability and Retributive Justice, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 127, 128 (2005); see also 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 29–30 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (suggesting Yamashita’s prosecution was an 
“impulse[] of vengeance and retaliation”). 
50 Protocol I, Article 86, titled “Failure to Act,” states: 
1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and 
take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol 
which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so. 
2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate 
does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they 
knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the 
time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 42–43 
[hereinafter Protocol I]. 
51 The ICTY and ICTR provisions are substantively identical:  
The fact that any of the acts referred to [in the respective articles of each Statute] was committed 
by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason 
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the International Criminal Court.52 These documents reaffirm the core 
elements of command responsibility from Yamashita and attempt to answer 
the doctrine’s open-ended questions. Together, they demonstrate marked 
progress in the development of command responsibility. Differences 
among the individual provisions, though, illustrate that some uncertainties 
in the doctrine remain. 
In the past five decades, the international community has settled on the 
first two unanswered questions from Yamashita: the breadth of a 
commander’s duty and how to measure his efforts. At first, commanders 
were simply required to “repress grave breaches” of the laws of war.53 This 
meant that they were only culpable for failing to prevent ongoing crimes or 
crimes that were about to occur. The most current articulations of the 
doctrine, however, state that a commander also has the duty to “punish the 
perpetrators” of a crime.54 Thus, commanders must act when they discover 
a crime ex post facto. Similarly, international law has firmly established the 
requisite level of effort required by a commander to fulfill his duty. He 
must take all “necessary and reasonable measures” to either prevent or 
punish the commission of a crime.55 The provision is adaptable to the 
circumstances of each case and seeks to determine whether the commander 
had the “effective ability” to take prophylactic measures.56 
Despite the agreement on the above issues, there is little consensus on 
the remaining two questions from Yamashita: the requisite level of mens 
rea and the appropriate role of causation in command responsibility.57 With 
 
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof. 
Compare Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
1877, art. 7(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], with Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 1901, art. 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1901 (Dec. 16, 
2009) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
52 Article 28 of the Rome Statute establishes: 
(a) A military commander . . . shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control 
properly over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, 
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 19 
[hereinafter Rome Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-
ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf.  
53 Protocol I, supra note 50. 
54 ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51. 
55 Rome Statute, supra note 52; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51. 
56 MELONI, supra note 14, at 171–72.  
57 See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18–20; Hansen, supra note 25, at 403. 
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respect to mens rea, most agree that requiring a commander to have actual 
knowledge of a crime is unproductive.58 Thus, each international statute 
and treaty establishes a mens rea requirement below knowledge.59 None of 
these provisions, however, agrees on a single standard.60 Commentators 
disagree as to what constitutes an appropriate mens rea regime as well.61 
Similarly, the role of causation remains unsettled. On one hand, Protocol I 
and the Rome Statute require that a subordinate’s crime be the result of his 
commander’s omission.62 On the other, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes omit a 
causation analysis altogether.63 Jurists and scholars have yet to propose a 
widely accepted formulation as well.64 
The struggle to define the latter two elements of command 
responsibility revolves around the tension between the doctrine’s principle 
aim—deterrence—and notions of fundamental fairness.65 Amidst the fog of 
war, military leaders “bear the brunt of preventing” violations of the law of 
war.66 They are tasked with instilling discipline among their subordinates 
and controlling those subordinates’ use of force. Under the threat of 
criminal punishment, these commanders are encouraged to provide “the 
maximum degree of control and vigilance” over their soldiers.67 In this 
sense, leaders become the instrument that international law uses to prevent 
 
58 See, e.g., Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 20 (stating that a knowledge standard is an invitation to 
“see and hear no evil” (quoting Roger S. Clark, Medina: An Essay on the Principles of Criminal 
Liability for Homicide, 5 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 59, 78 (1973))). 
59 See Protocol I, supra note 50; ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51; Rome 
Statute, supra note 52. 
60 See Protocol I, supra note 50 (listing mens rea standard as “if they knew, or had information that 
should have enabled them to conclude”); ICTY Statute, supra note 51 (listing mens rea standard as 
“knew or had reason to know”); Rome Statute, supra note 52 (listing mens rea standard as “knew or, 
owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known”). Complicating the matter further, few 
jurists agree on the exact meaning of each phrase. See Hansen, supra note 25, at 405 (“It is not unusual 
for tribunals to place different meanings on the same terms.”). 
61 Compare Hansen, supra note 19, at 269 (advocating for a Model Penal Code-based formulation), 
with Smidt, supra note 20, at 217 (advocating for an ICC formulation).  
62 Protocol I, supra note 50; Rome Statute, supra note 52. 
63 ICTR Statute, supra note 51; ICTY Statute, supra note 51; see also MELONI, supra note 14, at 
127 (stating that it is unclear from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals whether a causal 
relationship is required). 
64 See MELONI, supra note 14, at 173–74. Several proposed causation standards include: an 
increased-risk approach, actual and proximate causation, and an encouragement test. See id. at 177 
(describing the ICC’s implementation of an increased-risk approach); Hansen, supra note 19, at 272 
(advocating a proximate cause analysis); Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 719–20 (advocating an 
encouragement test); Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing 
a “natural and probable consequence” standard). 
65 See O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 151–52 (stating that in the context of international crimes the 
“United Nations is focused on the objectives of deterrence and just punishment”). 
66 Hackel, supra note 11, at 266.  
67 MELONI, supra note 14, at 31. 
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future crimes.68 However, “fairness in determining criminal 
accountability . . . require[s] some personal involvement on the part of the 
commander.”69 Taken to the extreme, a prevention-based justification for 
command responsibility could easily translate into strict liability70—a 
notion that has been rejected from the outset.71 The shifting landscape of 
command responsibility results from swings between the counterweights of 
deterrence and fairness. 
Despite this tension, the international community seems to have settled 
on the following: Commanders have a legal duty to prevent, suppress, and 
punish any law-of-war violations within their chain of command.72 They 
must take all necessary and reasonable measures to fulfill these duties.73 A 
commander is culpable if he has knowledge of a crime74 and if his breach 
of duty proves to be a catalyst for his subordinate’s actions.75 At the very 
least, these tenets form the core of the modern doctrine. 
II. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
Although command responsibility holds a prominent place within 
international law, it is less pervasive under domestic military law. The 
doctrine has been incorporated within U.S. military dogma since 195676 but 
has not been codified within the UCMJ. Command responsibility thus 
serves as a guiding principle for military discipline, but not as a direct 
criminal tool for military prosecutors. The U.S. military instead scrutinizes 
command responsibility-type issues under the same lens as all other types 
of leadership failures. As such, commanders who fail to prevent or punish 
war crimes are typically disciplined using a traditional framework of 
administrative and criminal provisions, as opposed to a distinct command 
responsibility provision.77 
 
68 Id.  
69 Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18.  
70 See Mirjan Damaska, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 
480–81 (2001) (discussing how even a negligence standard can “begin to shade into liability without 
culpability”). 
71 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.  
72 See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.  
74 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
75 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.  
76 See FM 27-10, supra note 18, paras. 178–79. The doctrine’s tenets have been reaffirmed recently 
upon the release of the U.S. military’s COIN manual. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, 
COUNTERINSURGENCY app. para. D-24 (15 Dec. 2006) [hereinafter FM 3-24].  
77 See infra Part II.B. 
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A. Murder in Kandahar 
To better understand how the U.S. military currently punishes 
leadership failures and how such failures could be punished under a 
substantive command responsibility provision, it is first helpful to draw on 
two recent incidents. One is the 5th Stryker Brigade Kill Team murders that 
occurred near Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2010. The other is the Staff 
Sergeant Bales civilian massacre that took place near the same area in 
March 2012. Both offer valuable insight into the current military justice 
system and the most principled approach for implementing command 
responsibility domestically. 
1. The Afghan Kill Team.—In March 2011, a reporter from Rolling 
Stone magazine revealed how several soldiers in a platoon planned, 
executed, and covered up the murder of at least three innocent Afghan 
civilians.78 The soldiers, who were members of 3rd Platoon, Bravo 
Company, 2-1 Infantry, 5th Stryker Brigade, first deployed to Afghanistan 
in July 2009. Throughout their first several months of operating near 
Kandahar, the platoon sustained several casualties, but had little 
opportunity to identify and engage the enemy directly.79 After a popular 
squad leader80 was wounded, Staff Sergeant Calvin Gibbs was transferred 
to the platoon to take over this role. Shortly after his arrival, Gibbs 
concocted a plan to turn morale around. After weeks of discussion, he 
convinced several members of his squad to start staging attacks in order to 
justify killing Afghan “savages.”81 
The first staged killing occurred in January 2010 in the isolated 
farming village of La Mohammad Kalay. While their platoon leader, First 
Lieutenant Roman Ligsay, and another officer were conducting a village 
meeting, Gibbs and two of his subordinates identified a teenage boy on the 
village outskirts as a target. One Kill Team82 member tossed a grenade at 
the boy’s feet, waited until it exploded, and then joined another member in 
shooting the boy. The two claimed that a lone Taliban fighter attempted to 
ambush the unit in broad daylight with a single grenade—“an unlikely 
story.”83 Shortly after the attack, a village elder approached the patrol’s 
 
78 See generally Boal, supra note 10. 
79 Id. at 58, 64.  
80 A squad leader is a small-unit commander who is typically in charge of four to ten soldiers and 
holds the rank of Staff Sergeant. See Operational Unit Diagrams, U.S. ARMY, http://www.army.mil/
info/organization/unitsandcommands/oud/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
81 See Boal, supra note 10, at 58; see also Craig Whitlock, Soldier Says Afghans’ Killings Were 
Plotted by Staff Sergeant, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2010, at A14, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/27/AR2010092705753.htm. 
82 Mark Boal used the moniker “Kill Team” in his article exposing the murders. Boal, supra note 
10, at 56. There is no evidence that the soldiers in Gibbs’s squad referred to themselves as such.  
83 Id. at 58. 
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leaders, claiming that the boy was murdered.84 However, these leaders 
ignored both the elder and the questionable circumstances. Within a few 
days of the killing, the teenager’s uncle, along with several other villagers, 
“descended on the gates of [the unit’s base] . . . to demand an 
investigation.”85 The soldiers involved were re-interviewed, but the 
battalion’s investigating officer believed there were “no inconsistencies in 
their story.”86 
Gibbs staged another attack in the village of Kari Kheyl a month later. 
Prior to the mission, he had scrounged up a series of drop weapons87 to 
bolster his cover stories. For this killing, he had found a functioning AK-47 
rifle. During the mission, while the rest of the platoon was legitimately 
engaged with other village members, Gibbs identified his target. He fired 
the AK-47 into a nearby wall, threw it at the victim’s feet, and shot the man 
with the help of two other subordinates.88 Gibbs later reported the victim 
shot first, but then had his rifle jam. A fellow squad leader, Staff Sergeant 
Sprague, inspected the AK-47 shortly thereafter and believed it be in 
perfect working condition. Later in the day, Sprague actually used the 
weapon after receiving fire and claimed it worked “with no problems at 
all.”89 After identifying this discrepancy, he reported it to Lieutenant 
Ligsay; however, the platoon leader did not look into the matter further.90 
Eventually Army investigators stumbled onto the killings after looking 
into a separate incident. In the course of their investigation, other members 
of the platoon reported that the Kill Team’s illegal exploits were common 
knowledge. In fact, the platoon had built a reputation for “staging killings 
and getting away with it.”91 Moreover, a few others indicated that they were 
well aware of the Kill Team’s ambitions prior to the first incident in 
January. 
Several months later, the Army launched a separate investigation into 
the question of officer accountability within 5th Stryker Brigade. The 
report found a system-wide breakdown of discipline. Officers generally did 
not communicate properly with their subordinates and showed contempt for 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 60. 
86 Id. 
87 During combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army maintains records of all 
ammunition, magazines, and explosives assigned and expended by units. A ‘drop weapon’ is generally 
a former enemy weapon or explosive, not listed in any records, which can be dropped at the scene, 
whenever a unit’s actions may have violated the rules of engagement. See American News Project, US 
Troops Discuss “Drop-Weapons,” YOUTUBE (June 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
SODTI_C1q_Q. Staff Sergeant Gibbs had found his ‘drop’ AK-47 while on a previous mission. Boal, 
supra note 10, at 66.  
88 Boal, supra note 10, at 67. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 60. 
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normal Army rules.92 Furthermore, several soldiers were caught smoking 
hashish in their Stryker vehicles, while others circulated photos of 
themselves standing over dead bodies, the latter of which is a law-of-war 
violation itself.93 The report also placed part of the blame directly on 
Colonel Harry Tunnell, the brigade commander.94 It claimed that his 
“inattentiveness to administrative matters . . . may have helped create an 
environment in which misconduct could occur.”95 It also questioned 
whether his open contempt for the Army’s COIN doctrine and outspoken 
support for “ruthlessly hunt[ing] down the Taliban”96 may have influenced 
the behavior of the Kill Team.97 
In the aftermath of the killings, the U.S. military summarily punished 
the soldiers directly involved in the crime. Staff Sergeant Gibbs was tried 
for murder and received a sentence of life in prison as the leader of the Kill 
Team.98 Most of the remaining Kill Team members pled guilty to murder or 
other charges and received lesser sentences—the maximum being twenty-
four years.99  
2. The Staff Sergeant Bales Massacre.—The Kill Team murders 
occurred over a series of months, whereas the Staff Sergeant Bales atrocity 
occurred in a single night. In the early morning hours of March 11, 2012, 
 
92 Soldiers were often found unshaven, conducted patrols with their sleeves rolled up, and called 
officers by their first names—all of which are basic infractions of Army policy. See Karin Assmann et 
al., ‘Let’s Kill’: Report Reveals Discipline Breakdown in Kill Team Brigade, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE 
(Apr. 4, 2011, 5:44 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/let-s-kill-report-reveals-discipline-
breakdown-in-kill-team-brigade-a-754952.html.  
93 See id.; see also Boal, supra note 10, at 60, 65. 
94 A brigade commander is a senior officer that is typically in charge of 3000–5000 soldiers and 
holds the rank of colonel. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.  
95 Assmann, supra note 92 (alteration in original). 
96 Id. 
97 See Craig Whitlock, Brigade’s Strategy: ‘Strike and Destroy,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2010, at 
A1.  
98 Nick Allen, Leader of US Army ‘Kill Team’ Guilty of Afghan Murders, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 12, 2011, 12:33 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8885631/
Leader-of-US-army-kill-team-guilty-of-Afghan-murders.html.  
99  Adam Ashton, On Appeal, Army Court Reduces One of Three “Kill Team” Murder Convictions, 
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (May 31, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/2014/05/31/3221157/on-appeal-
army-court-reduces-one.html (outlining Private First Class Holmes’s plea deal and seven-year 
sentence); Matthew Cole, ‘Kill Team’ Soldier Gets Three Years in Prison, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/kill-team-soldier-years-prison/story?id=14239130 (describing Specialist 
Winfield’s plea deal and three-year prison sentence); Court Sentences ‘Kill Team’ Soldier to 24 Years 
in Prison, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 24, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
murder-in-afghanistan-court-sentences-kill-team-soldier-to-24-years-in-prison-a-752918.html (noting 
Specialist Morlock pled guilty to multiple counts of murder (among other charges) and received twenty-
four years in prison). Military prosecutors, however, dropped all charges against Specialist Wagnon, 
whom the Army initially suspected of being the fifth Kill Team member. See Army Drops Murder 
Charge Against Last Soldier Tied to ‘Kill Team’ Cases, STARS AND STRIPES (Feb. 4, 2012), http://
www.stripes.com/army-drops-murder-charge-against-last-soldier-tied-to-kill-team-cases-1.167726.  
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Staff Sergeant Bales unexpectedly departed from Camp Belambay, a small 
U.S. outpost located near Kandahar.100 After walking past an Afghan guard, 
Bales traveled down the road to a nearby village.101 Once there, he 
proceeded to break into several homes and execute sixteen men, women, 
and children.102 Sometime during the night, an Afghan guard notified the 
chain of command that a U.S. soldier left the base carrying his weapon.103 
The outpost commander then ordered a headcount and realized that Bales 
was missing. Just after the commander dispatched a patrol to search for 
him, Bales returned by himself. Finding Bales covered in blood, several 
U.S. soldiers promptly detained him.104 
Earlier in the evening, Bales visited and drank with other members of 
his platoon. At one point, they discussed how a colleague had lost his leg in 
an attack the week prior. Later in the evening, he spoke with a senior 
noncommissioned officer about being disappointed that the unit had not 
retaliated for the attack.105 Leading up to the killings, Bales also began to 
frequently lash out at junior soldiers.106 Moreover, almost the entire day 
before the crime, he vented his anger by “chopping and sawing a large tree 
that the soldiers had taken down near the base.”107 The unit’s leadership, 
however, did not identify Bales as a potential law-of-war threat. In the end, 
Staff Sergeant Bales admitted to the killings, pled guilty, and received a 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.108 
B. The Prospects of Punishing Command Failures 
Although the punishment meted out to the Kill Team members and 
Staff Sergeant Bales was widely publicized, there is little information on 
whether their commanders received any discipline. It is likely that the 
commanders received little, if any, punishment for failing to prevent their 
 
100 Evans, supra note 9. 
101 Id.  
102 Kirk Johnson, Pretrial Hearing Starts for Soldier Accused of Murdering 16 Afghan Civilians, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012, at A16.  
103 See Evans, supra note 9. 
104 See Associated Press, Highlights of Testimony in Preliminary Trial of Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, 
OREGONIAN (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:43 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/
2012/11/highlights_of_testimony_in_pre.html. 
105 Id.  




108 Associated Press, Staff Sgt. Robert Bales Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Chance of Parole 
for Afghanistan Massacre that Left 16 Dead, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:35 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/army-staff-sgt-robert-bales-life-chance-parole-article-
1.1435117. 
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subordinates’ war crimes.109 Regardless of this outcome, there are a number 
of punitive measures the U.S. military could have applied to the Kill Team 
and Staff Sergeant Bales’ commanders. Such options include: applying 
administrative sanctions,110 implementing nonjudicial punishment,111 or 
charging the commanders with criminal dereliction of duty.112 These 
measures are available whenever a commander commits any type of 
serious leadership failure.  
There is also a fourth, seldom-used option that could have been 
applied (likely for the Kill Team murders only): charging a commander as 
an accomplice to the crime using Article 77 of the UCMJ. Military 
prosecutors have applied this approach at least once in American history in 
an effort to introduce command responsibility through the military 
judiciary.113 Part II.B outlines these current U.S. mechanisms and, using 
Lieutenant Ligsay as an example, demonstrates how they may be applied to 
commanders who fail to take appropriate action with respect to their 
subordinates’ war crimes. 
1. Noncriminal Punishment.—Army Regulation 27-10, the directive 
that governs military justice, permits senior leaders to employ a wide range 
of administrative measures to enforce discipline.114 Common methods 
include: issuing a letter of reprimand, giving a subordinate leader a 
negative evaluation report, or removing a subordinate commander from his 
position of authority.115  
Issuing a letter of reprimand is one of the more common approaches to 
addressing command failures.116 The letter is an official document that 
outlines how the recipient failed to comply with military standards. In 
Lieutenant Ligsay’s case, his letter would likely outline (among other 
things) how he failed to investigate the questionable circumstances 
surrounding Gibbs’s staged killings or report these disparities to his 
superiors. At the discretion of his commander, this letter can either be filed 
in Lieutenant Ligsay’s official record, which would likely cause serious 
 
109 There are no public reports indicating that any of the officers in the Kill Team or Staff Sergeant 
Bales’ chain of command were punished in connection with the war crimes committed.  
110 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 257.  
111 See Smith, supra note 24, at 685–86. 
112 See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012). 
113 See Howard, supra note 20 (discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Smidt, 
supra note 20, at 192–200 (same). 
114 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE paras. 3-3 to -4 (3 Oct. 2011) 
[hereinafter AR 27-10]. 
115 Id. 
116 For example, this was the approach taken toward two senior commanders involved with the 
Abu Ghraib scandal. Hansen, supra note 19, at 257 & n.43.  
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damage to his career, or his local file, which would result in relatively little 
damage.117 
In addition to writing letters of reprimand, a senior commander can 
also issue a negative evaluation report of his derelict subordinate118 or 
relieve him of command.119 Both of these measures are aimed at hurting the 
subordinate commander’s advancement prospects.120 They are especially 
damaging when used against more senior or career-minded military 
leaders. 
Nonjudicial punishment, authorized under Article 15 of the UCMJ, is 
a much more forceful tool than administrative action.121 In brief, it consists 
of referring a formal charge against a soldier or officer who has failed to 
maintain proper discipline or carry out his duty. Procedurally, a senior 
commander acts as both judge and jury, weighing the evidence of liability 
and considering any mitigating factors with respect to punishment.122 For 
example, if Lieutenant Ligsay were found guilty of permitting his soldiers 
to collect and retain drop weapons, his senior commander would be 
authorized to impose the following measures: reduction in rank, 
deprivation of pay, deprivation of liberty, or some combination thereof.123 
However, despite the few similarities between these proceedings and 
criminal trials, Article 15 punishment does not amount to criminal 
liability.124 
2. Criminal Punishment.—In addressing leadership failures, a senior 
commander could also initiate a criminal proceeding—i.e., trial by court 
martial.125 One route into the court martial system is for the senior 
commander to refer his subordinate leader for a dereliction of duty charge 
under Article 92. A more unorthodox approach, however, is also available 
if a senior commander believes his junior leader’s failure is particularly 
egregious. He can charge the junior leader directly with the underlying law-
of-war violation using Article 77. In other words, Lieutenant Ligsay could 
have been charged with murder in connection with the Kill Team’s three 
homicides. 
 
117 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-37, UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION para. 3-4 (19 Dec. 1986).  
118 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 623-3, EVALUATION REPORTING SYSTEM para. 3-4 (5 June 
2012). 
119 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 600-20, ARMY COMMAND POLICY para. 2-17 (18 March 2008).  
120 Cf. Hansen, supra note 19, at 257–58 (describing how informal sanctions ended the career of a 
senior commander involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal). 
121 See AR 27-10, supra note 114, at ch. 3. 
122 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. V, ¶ 4 (2012) [hereinafter MCM]. 
123 Id. at pt. V, ¶ 5. The appropriate authority could impose a reduction of rank by one level, 
forfeiture of a total of one month’s pay, impose after-hours duty assignments for up to forty-five or 
sixty days, or some combination thereof. Id. 
124 Id. at pt. V, ¶ 1b (“Nonjudicial punishment is a disciplinary measure more serious than the 
administrative corrective measures . . . but less serious than trial by court-martial.”). 
125 For an overview of the court martial process, see Smith, supra note 24, at 686–93. 
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a. Article 92: dereliction of duty.—The first type of criminal 
charge that may be leveled at a commander who fails to prevent or punish a 
law-of-war violation is dereliction of duty. Under Article 92, any soldier 
who “is derelict in the performance of his duties[] shall be punished as a 
court-martial may direct.”126 If Lieutenant Ligsay’s failure to prevent the 
Kill Team murders qualifies as dereliction, he is thus subject to the 
provision’s criminal penalties. 
Despite Article 92’s vague language, three elements are needed to 
establish Lieutenant Ligsay’s criminality. First, a military prosecutor must 
prove that Lieutenant Ligsay had a duty to prevent, suppress, or punish 
law-of-war violations committed by his subordinates.127 Although the 
UCMJ does not specifically establish these duties, they could flow from the 
Fourth Hague Convention. According to the Manual for Courts-Martial 
(MCM),128 a soldier’s duty may be defined by “treaty, statute, regulation, 
lawful order, standard operating procedure, or custom of the service.”129 
Under the Hague Convention, a commander has “the legal obligation to 
control the conduct of his forces such that they can achieve military 
objectives without . . . committing unnecessary suffering . . . to non-
combatants.”130 As such, a commander’s overall duty to control may 
encompass the specific duties to prevent, suppress, and punish a 
subordinate’s war crimes under the MCM standard.131 Even if the court-
martial does not find a duty from the Hague Convention, Lieutenant Ligsay 
at least had a specific duty to report any suspected war crimes occurring 
within his unit.132 His duty to report would have stemmed from the rules of 
engagement operating in Afghanistan at the time.133 
A prosecutor must establish next that Lieutenant Ligsay had “[a]ctual 
knowledge . . . [or] reasonably should have known” about his duty to 
prevent or report law-of-war violations.134 Although this language indicates 
 
126 10 U.S.C. § 892(3) (2012).  
127 Hansen, supra note 25, at 394.  
128 “The MCM is an executive order that details the rules for administering military justice. For 
example, it sets forth the rules of evidence for courts-martial and contains a list of maximum 
punishments for each offense.” U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., 
COMMANDER’S LEGAL HANDBOOK 7 (2013). 
129 MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(a).  
130 Hansen, supra note 19, at 254 (citing Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631). 
131 Cf. id. at 254–55 (“Even though the elements and explanations [of dereliction of duty] do not 
explicitly mention the special legal duties imposed on a commander for the conduct of his subordinates, 
[the MCM’s definition of duty] is certainly broad enough to include a commander’s duties and 
responsibilities over his forces.”). 
132 According to the Army’s standard rules of engagement, all soldiers have a duty to “report any 
suspected violations of the Law of War committed by any US . . . force.” See, e.g., MND-N ROE Card 
(Jan. 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
133 See id. 
134 MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(b). 
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a mens rea standard of negligence, there is some precedent suggesting 
commanders must have actually known about these duties in order to 
impose criminal liability.135 Regardless of the standard, it would be difficult 
for Lieutenant Ligsay to argue he did not have such knowledge. This is 
especially true regarding his duty to report, because all soldiers are required 
to know their rules of engagement.136 
Lastly, a commander must actually be derelict with respect to his 
duty.137 To be derelict, Lieutenant Ligsay must have willfully or negligently 
failed to perform his duties or performed them in a culpably negligent 
manner.138 This would be an issue for a military jury to decide. Assuming 
arguendo that he is guilty, however, the maximum punishment for 
negligent dereliction is three months confinement in a military prison.139 
b. Article 77: principals.—Alternatively, it would have been 
possible for Lieutenant Ligsay’s senior commander to initiate a murder 
charge against him as a principal to the staged killings using Article 77. At 
first glance, the approach seems counterintuitive in this case, because the 
statute’s language is directed at leaders who actively participate in their 
subordinates’ crimes.140 Article 77 identifies as a principal any commander 
who affirmatively “aids, abets, counsels, commands, or procures” the 
commission of a crime.141 Lieutenant Ligsay did not have any such direct 
involvement in the murders. However, the court-martial in United States v. 
Medina—the most prominent command responsibility case in American 
history—adopted the approach of using Article 77 to charge commanders 
with their subordinate’s war crime when there is only passive complicity.142 
United States v. Medina was a byproduct of the infamous My Lai 
massacre during the Vietnam War. In brief, Captain Medina’s company 
conducted an assault on the village of My Lai.143 Although he expected 
heavy resistance, his lead unit initially reported little to no enemy 
presence.144 Soon thereafter, the same unit opened fire on unarmed 
villagers, killing hundreds.145 In the meantime, Captain Medina, who was 
 
135 Hansen, supra note 19, at 255–56 (citing United States v. Ferguson, 40 M.J. 823, 833–34 
(N.M.C.M.R. 1994)). 
136 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 7-21.13, THE SOLDIER’S GUIDE para. 1-79 (2 Feb. 
2004) [hereinafter FM 7-21.13].  
137 Hansen, supra note 25, at 394. 
138 MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16c(3)(c); see also Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21.  
139 MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 16e(3)(A). The maximum punishment for willful dereliction 
is six months. Id. at pt. IV, ¶ 16e(3)(B). 
140 Smidt, supra note 20, at 195.  
141 10 U.S.C. § 877 (2012).  
142 See Howard, supra note 20 (discussing United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)); Smidt, 
supra note 20, at 192–200 (same). 
143 Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 12.  
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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controlling the battlefield from only 150 meters away, did not radio his 
platoon to stop shooting until nearly three hours after the assault began.146 
He later admitted that “he had no reason to believe My Lai was contested 
by the enemy and that he had lost control of his company.”147 
The prosecution convinced the court that Article 77 applied in this 
case based on a discussion section accompanying the provision in the 
MCM.148 The discussion section indicated that a commander could be liable 
for failing to suppress a war crime under certain conditions.149 Namely, the 
commander’s failure to act must have actually encouraged the subordinate 
and the commander must have intended his failure to act as 
encouragement.150 Relying on this theory, the judge gave the following jury 
instruction at trial: 
[A] commander is also responsible if he has actual knowledge that troops or 
other persons subject to his control are in the process of committing or are 
about to commit a war crime and he wrongfully fails to take the necessary and 
reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war.151 
These instructions show that there is room within the UCMJ to convict 
commanders who fail to suppress the commission of a war crime. As 
Captain Medina’s acquittal later demonstrated, however, the standard is 
exacting. Prosecutors must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
commander has actual knowledge of the crime and that his failure served as 
encouragement.152 Therefore, even though senior military leaders likely 
chose not to punish Lieutenant Ligsay for his command failures, they had 
several punitive measures available should they have decided to punish 
him. 
 
146 Id. at 14. 
147 Id. 
148 See Smidt, supra note 20, at 196–98 (quoting MCM, supra note 122, at pt. IV, ¶ 1b(2)(b) to 
¶ 1b(3)). The relevant discussion indicates that a narrow affirmative duty exists when certain persons 
witness a crime, including commanders.  
149 Id. at 197. The combination of the discussion section and a customary duty to control 
subordinates is what creates this duty. Id.  
150 Id. at 198.  
151 Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 15 (quoting Instructions to the Court Members, Appellate Exhibit 
XCIII, at 18, United States v. Medina, C.M. 427162 (1971)). The trial judge, in a later article discussing 
this standard, explained further:  
[I]f the commander gains actual knowledge and does nothing, then he may become a principal in 
the eyes of the law in that by his inaction he manifests an aiding and encouraging support to his 
troops, thereby indicating that he joins in their activity and wishes the end product to come about. 
Smidt, supra note 20, at 198 (alteration in original) (quoting Howard, supra note 20, at 22). 
152 See Sengheiser, supra note 24, at 715–16 (“Medina was acquitted on the basis of his lack of 
actual knowledge of the atrocities.”). In a general court-martial, the accused is “presumed to be 
innocent until [his] guilt is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt.” 
MCM, supra note 122, R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(A). 
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY CLIMATE 
Despite the breadth of punitive measures available for punishing 
leadership failures, the current military justice system has received scant 
support from legal scholars interested in the doctrine of command 
responsibility.153 They contend that the system either lacks adequate 
punitive measures to compel law-of-war compliance among commanders 
or hinders the military’s ability to carry out its mission.154 Amplifying these 
criticisms, two military lawyers have advocated for the adoption of a 
command responsibility provision within the UCMJ that resembles the 
international version of the doctrine.155 By codifying command 
responsibility, they assert, the U.S. military will be better able to prevent 
the next major law-of-war violation. Accordingly, Part III will first discuss 
the criticisms of the current military justice system and then introduce two 
proposals for adopting a command responsibility statute in the United 
States. 
A. Critiques of the Current System 
Legal scholars studying command responsibility offer two principal 
critiques of the American approach. The first critique faults the UCMJ for 
not offering sufficient incentives to ensure leaders take their law-of-war 
responsibilities seriously.156 The severity of punishment associated with 
administrative blowback, nonjudicial action, or a dereliction of duty charge 
“does not adequately inform military commanders that law-of-war 
compliance is a matter for their direct and constant attention.”157 
Considering the “complex, confusing, and dangerous environment” of war, 
the threat of a reprimand, reduction in rank, loss in pay, or even a six-
month prison sentence seems like an inappropriate means of persuading 
commanders to diligently root out war crimes.158 Critics could further argue 
 
153 See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–54 (focusing on Abu Ghraib scandal); Peters, supra 
note 21, at 939–43 (discussing the Haditha incident). 
154 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266 (finding that after reviewing the punitive Articles, “the 
unmistakable conclusion is that the incentives under the UCMJ are inadequate”); Peters, supra note 21, 
at 942 (“The way ahead for US military justice and the vexing problem of command responsibility 
remains open. Acknowledging serious deficiencies in the current process is only the first step.”); 
Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that under the current 
system, U.S. war crimes “often initially go unreported, and almost always go unpunished”); see also 
William C. Westmoreland & George S. Prugh, Judges in Command: The Judicialized Uniform Code of 
Military Justice in Combat, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (1980) (arguing generally that the UCMJ is 
inadequate to perform its function in times of war). 
155 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19. 
156 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 258; see also Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21–22. 
157 Hansen, supra note 19, at 258. 
158 See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 21; Hansen, supra note 19, at 256; see also Sepinwall, supra 
note 21, at 258–59 (discussing how Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Sassaman received a “mere wrist slap” 
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that the threat of a murder charge against a commander using Article 77 is 
hollow as well because of the difficulty associated with the “actual 
knowledge” requirement.159 
The second principal critique of the current U.S. approach to 
command responsibility is that it degrades the military’s image and ability 
to function effectively. The disparity between the U.S. and international 
approaches to command responsibility reinforces the notion that the United 
States is not serious about the law of war.160 It also weakens the legitimacy 
of U.S.-led military campaigns overseas, making long-term operations 
more difficult to sustain.161 Furthermore, the legal regime helps create the 
perception that only lower ranking soldiers are held accountable for their 
criminal conduct.162 This inequality of accountability erodes support for 
military operations at home and affects discipline in the field, as lower 
level soldiers may grow distrustful of their superiors.163 
B. Codifying Command Responsibility 
Two military law practitioners go beyond identifying flaws in the 
American command responsibility structure to argue that the most effective 
response is to codify the doctrine within the UCMJ.164 They claim that the 
doctrine’s international formulations would serve as an appropriate model 
to do so.165 Both proposals therefore draw extensively on the principles and 
language of the ad hoc Tribunal and Rome Statutes and seek to implement 
a more rigid standard on commanders. Although these proposals 
demonstrate marked progress in the discussion on command responsibility 
within the United States, they ultimately fall short of establishing a 
workable standard for American military forces. 
 
 
for covering up incident in his battalion where a subordinate leader threw several Iraqis off a bridge, 
killing at least one). 
159 Medina’s acquittal demonstrates the difficultly of this standard.  
160 Cf. Smidt, supra note 20, at 156, 215–16. 
161 Id. at 156. 
162 See Hansen, supra note 25, at 398; see also Smith, supra 24, at 674–75 (discussing disparity of 
punishment between soldiers and commanders in Abu Gharib affair); cf. Elizabeth L. Hillman, 
Gentlemen Under Fire: The U.S. Military and “Conduct Unbecoming,” 26 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 (2008) 
(“[T]he perception that high-ranking officers are rarely disciplined and almost never criminally 
prosecuted is so common partly because it is true.”). 
163 See Hansen, supra note 25, at 398.  
164 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58; Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19. 
165 As an initial matter, the customary and treaty-based international law outlined in Part I has not 
been directly incorporated into U.S. military law. The United States has yet to ratify the Rome Statute. 
See David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statue of the International 
Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 984 (2008). Furthermore, customary international 
law may not be incorporated within federal law without the approval of the Senate. See Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that international treaties are not self-executing). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1408 
1. Incorporating the ICC into Article 77.—In a review of the 
command responsibility doctrine prior to 9/11, Michael Smidt offers a 
simple solution to the problems associated with command responsibility in 
the United States: incorporate Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute wholesale 
into the UCMJ.166 He proposes adopting the language of the Rome Statute 
almost verbatim and placing command responsibility within the confines of 
Article 77. Smidt’s provision states: 
(3) [I]n the case of a military commander or a person effectively acting as a 
military commander, while on a military operation outside the territory of the 
United States, however the operation is characterized, where forces under his 
or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the 
case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise proper control over 
such forces, where[:] 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or owing to the 
circumstances a[t] the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit a crime under this chapter; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission; is a principal.167 
Although Smidt does not resolve some of the ambiguous language within 
the ICC, he does insist that the proposal embraces a negligence standard for 
mens rea.168 
2. Adjusting Article 92: A New Dereliction of Duty.—After 
examining the fallout of the Abu Ghraib scandal, Victor Hansen also 
identifies a need to adopt command responsibility into the UCMJ.169 He 
proposes punishing these types of command failures as derelictions of duty 
rather than treating the commander as a principal to the crime.170 Hansen’s 
proposed provision would apply to any military leader exercising command 
authority over a subordinate and would be triggered when the subordinate 
has committed or is about to commit a war crime specified in the War 
Crimes Act of 1996.171 To satisfy the mens rea requirement under Hansen’s 
proposal, a prosecutor may show that the commander had knowledge of, or 
was reckless or negligent with respect to his knowledge of, the war 
crimes.172 Once a commander knows about the crime, or at least should 
have known, he has a duty to prevent, suppress, or punish the crime using 
“all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power.”173 
 
166 See Smidt, supra note 20, at 215–19.  
167 Id. at 217.  
168 See id. at 217–18. 
169 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–58.  
170 See id. at 272 app. 
171 Id. at 267–68.  
172 Id. at 269.  
173 Id. (quoting Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 28(a)(ii)). 
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Moreover, the commander’s failure must be a “proximate cause” of the 
subordinate’s crime.174 
The most novel aspect of Hansen’s scheme is his method of 
determining punishment. For Hansen, punishment should vary according to 
the level of mens rea and type of failure. If a commander knows about a 
war crime and fails to prevent it, he faces the possibility of capital 
punishment. If his failure was reckless or negligent, he could receive a 
maximum sentence of life in prison or a twenty-year prison term, 
respectively. If a commander fails to punish a war crime he knows has 
occurred, his maximum punishment is a two-year prison sentence. Reckless 
failures to punish incur a sentence of one year, whereas grossly negligent 
failures warrant a six-month sentence.175 Overall, Hansen believes this 
scheme will effectively balance a commander’s freedom to maneuver while 
creating legal incentives to make law-of-war compliance a top priority.176 
IV. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE, AND 
SMALL-UNIT COMMANDERS 
Assuming the scholarly critiques of the current U.S. military justice 
system are valid and adopting a substantive command responsibility 
provision within the UCMJ is needed,177 both the Hansen and Smidt 
proposals still fall short of providing a workable standard. Both plans fail to 
adequately consider their effects on small-unit leaders. Modern warfare has 
shifted increasingly toward a COIN model since the Vietnam War.178 In this 
model, small-unit commanders have taken on more complex and important 
roles. They are often entrusted with broad authority to operate in their own 
battle spaces and are the keys to both successful COIN operations and 
preventing law-of-war abuses in their areas.179 
Prevailing scholarly opinion of command responsibility, however, 
focuses mainly on the need to apply punitive measures against senior 
military leaders.180 As a result, most command responsibility provisions, 
including the Hansen and Smidt proposals, are designed to reach the 
passive failures of high-ranking commanders.181 This means that when 
these provisions address the more controversial aspects of command 
responsibility (i.e., causation and mens rea), they generally embrace a low 
threshold for liability. Otherwise, a senior commander may escape the 
 
174 Id. at 272 app.  
175 Id. at 272–73 app.  
176 Id. at 270.  
177 See supra note 24.  
178 See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 160–67 (discussing U.S’s COIN approach during Vietnam War). 
179 See id. at 236; Hackel, supra note 11, at 266. 
180 See sources cited supra note 25. 
181 See supra notes 50–52. The ad hoc and Rome Statutes all establish low thresholds for command 
liability. 
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reach of the statute altogether because it is often hard to link him with the 
actual commission of a war crime.182 
This low threshold creates serious problems for small-unit 
commanders. For these leaders, who have a much closer connection to a 
subordinate-offender, the proposed standards function as a near-strict 
liability regime. Given the importance of small-unit commanders in COIN 
operations, this implication highlights the need to readdress command 
responsibility in a more nuanced manner if it is to be adopted within the 
UCMJ. A more principled approach would be to draft a provision that 
focuses on the cost and benefits of liability for small-unit commanders. 
This approach is imperative if the U.S. military continues to engage 
predominantly in COIN conflicts in the future. 
A. The Influence of COIN Operations on Command Responsibility 
The increased role of small-unit commanders, both operationally and 
with respect to the laws of war, is generally the result of a shift in modern 
warfare toward COIN operations. Although the U.S. military did not 
formally adopt a COIN approach until the middle of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, it has studied and applied COIN tactics since the 
Vietnam War.183 In contrast to traditional warfare, COIN requires soldiers 
to concentrate on more than just engaging the enemy. Soldiers must 
become nation builders as well as security forces.184 In addition to seeking 
out insurgents, they must be equally prepared to help reestablish local 
councils and police forces, rebuild infrastructure, and provide humanitarian 
relief.185 
A counterinsurgent’s main goal is to establish legitimacy for the local 
government and the rule of law.186 Conversely, insurgents seek to mobilize 
support for their cause by using various techniques such as persuasion, 
coercion, reaction to abuses, and foreign support.187 In light of this conflict, 
COIN is often described as a battle for the “hearts and minds” of the local 
populace.188 “Put in the context of Iraq, the insurgency consists of those 
enemy forces seeking to . . . convince the Iraqi public not to support the 
 
182 See Martinez, supra note 21, at 369 (stating that “hard proof of the connection between the 
generals and the crimes committed by their foot soldiers is often extremely difficult to find”); Wu & 
Kang, supra note 13, at 272 (“The further away a superior is from the actual ‘smoking gun,’ however, 
the more difficult he is to prosecute.”). 
183 See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 160–67 (discussing the U.S. military’s COIN approach during the 
Vietnam War). The United States officially embraced COIN as a method of warfare in 2006 when it 
was adopted into military doctrine. See generally FM 3-24, supra note 76. 
184 David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, Foreword to FM 3-24, supra note 76. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. 
187 FM 3-24, supra note 76, paras. 1-41 to -46. 
188 MOYAR, supra note 28, at 2. 
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transition to democracy . . . .”189 In response, the U.S. strategy has become 
one of “clear-hold-build.”190 In short, units must first establish security in 
an area, build a long-term foothold of support within the population, and 
then work with local leaders to build governmental capacity.191 
The result of this strategy is that COIN operations are highly 
decentralized.192 Because success depends on a thorough understanding of 
local history, customs, and politics, resources and responsibility are pushed 
to the lowest level on the ground.193 Company- and platoon-sized194 
elements control their own battle spaces and often build small combat 
outposts near important population centers.195 As one battalion commander 
put it: “I delegate authority [to subordinate commanders] until I feel 
uncomfortable, and then I know I’ve got it about right.”196 Consequently, 
small-unit commanders effectively fight hundreds of smaller COIN wars 
while senior commanders coordinate these conflicts and provide guidance 
and direction.197 
Because these small-unit commanders operate with much less direct 
supervision than they did in traditional warfare, law-of-war compliance has 
become even more of a ground-level campaign. The degree of 
independence, responsibility, and authority that these commanders enjoy 
necessitates a focus by scholars on their legal incentives. Small-unit 
commanders have always been the greatest line of defense in this area;198 
however, the current modus operandi of military operations makes their 
role even more essential. Small-unit commanders bear the greatest burden 
in preventing war crimes, in addition to rebuilding communities and 
engaging insurgents. The command responsibility doctrine should thus 
reflect this reality in a manner that permits these commanders to lead 
without an unreasonable fear of criminal liability for their subordinates’ 
actions and simultaneously drives them to prioritize compliance with the 
laws of war. 
 
189 Hackel, supra note 11, at 263–64 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190 FM 3-24, supra note 76, paras. 5-50 to -54. 
191 Id. paras. 5-51 to -80. 
192 Id. paras. 1-145 to -146. 
193 Id. 
194 A company is a military unit that consists of 100 to 200 soldiers, whereas a platoon is a unit 
comprised of up to forty soldiers. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.  
195 See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 236 (describing how Marines in Iraq established “a galaxy of 
small outposts in the district’s towns and along its roads, which they used as living quarters and bases 
for combined patrolling”).  
196 Kalev I Sepp, From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: The Fall and Rise of US 
Counterinsurgency Capability in Iraq, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 217, 226 (2007). 
197 See MOYAR, supra note 28, at 5–6.  
198 See Hackel, supra note 11, at 266. 
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B. Carving Out Room for Small-Unit Commanders 
Although the COIN doctrine gives special consideration to small-unit 
commanders, the doctrine of command responsibility does not. The 
doctrine typically applies to any serviceman “who is entitled to give orders 
to soldiers that it is the latter’s duty to obey.”199 Consequently, command 
responsibility applies to every leader in the military, from team leaders and 
platoon leaders to company commanders and commanding generals.200 
Needless to say, a commanding general is liable under the doctrine if he 
satisfies the same criminal elements as a team leader. So in theory, small-
unit and senior commanders are equal in the eyes command responsibility. 
The doctrine provides the same incentives for all military leaders to ensure 
their subordinates comply with the laws of war.201 
In reality, command responsibility does not affect all military 
commanders equally. Instead, the doctrine applies much more forcefully to 
small-unit commanders than their senior counterparts. Consider the case of 
Lieutenant Ligsay and his brigade commander, Colonel Tunnell. Imagine 
that Congress had adopted a command responsibility provision that 
incorporated a mens rea requirement of recklessness prior to the Kill Team 
murders.202 This provision would not have applied to Lieutenant Ligsay and 
Colonel Tunnell with equal measure. As a platoon leader, Lieutenant 
Ligsay interacted with the subordinate-offenders on a continuous basis 
during his deployment. On the other hand, as a brigade commander, 
Colonel Tunnell was quite removed from the same enlisted soldiers who 
carried out the murders. It would be far easier to establish that Lieutenant 
Ligsay consciously disregarded any warning signs about the staged killings 
than Colonel Tunnell did.203 Therefore, Lieutenant Ligsay’s incentives and 
potential for liability would be increased much more dramatically, while 
Colonel Tunnell would likely be indifferent to the change. 
The same disparate impact occurs when conducting a causation 
analysis. Colonel Tunnell’s distance from the “smoking gun” serves as a 
substantial obstacle for establishing a causal link between him and the 
violation of the law of war.204 The distance between Lieutenant Ligsay and 
the same “smoking gun,” however, is significantly closer and serves as a 
much smaller hurdle. Considering the difficultly in establishing command 
 
199 MELONI, supra note 14, at 155.  
200 In the Army, Team Leaders are typically junior sergeants in charge of four soldiers. Platoon 
leaders are generally lieutenants in charge of forty to sixty soldiers. Company commanders are usually 
captains with authority over 100–200 soldiers. A commanding two-star general is typically in charge of 
10,000–18,000 soldiers. See Operational Unit Diagrams, supra note 80.  
201 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 267.  
202 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c).  
203 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 273 (“The further away a superior is from the actual 
‘smoking gun,’ however, the more difficult he is to prosecute.”). 
204 See id.  
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responsibility for senior leaders, currently enacted provisions effectively 
establish a low threshold for liability.205 A more rigorous standard may 
otherwise remove senior commanders from the operational scope of the 
doctrine. 
Any attempt to bring senior commanders within the reach of the 
doctrine through low liability thresholds has deleterious consequences for 
small-unit commanders. As illustrated above, adopting a recklessness mens 
rea requirement increases the prospect of liability for junior commanders 
considerably. Lowering this bar further, both as to mens rea and causation, 
would come dangerously close to creating a strict liability regime for small-
unit commanders.206 At the very least, it would create the appearance of a 
no-fault standard that gives small-unit leaders little room for error with 
respect to law-of-war violations. 
This result is problematic for two main reasons. First, establishing a 
near-strict liability standard violates notions of fundamental fairness.207 
Small-unit commanders may be convicted of murder or manslaughter with 
little to no connection to the crime. The Staff Sergeant Bales atrocity 
illustrates this point well. Bales’s superiors would arguably meet some of 
the international formulations of command responsibility even though there 
is a tenuous connection between their conduct and the crime. Their 
culpability would dangle simply on a failure to address Bales’s post-
traumatic stress following the loss of a comrade and a single retributive 
statement made hours before the murders.208 In the aftermath of the 
incident, however, no one has argued that these superiors are culpable. 
Second, the ICC system would severely hinder a small-unit 
commander’s ability to focus on his mission. These leaders are tasked with 
rebuilding communities and engaging an elusive enemy, in addition to 
maintaining the fitness of their soldiers, weapons, and equipment.209 As 
such, there is constant competition for a commander’s time and attention. 
Although commanders may need stronger incentives to prioritize law-of-
war compliance in this competition, it must not become a debilitating 
concern.210 There is already a sense of unease among small-unit 
commanders that investigations or worse, criminal liability, will follow 
every command failure.211 
 
205 This means in practice that command responsibility provisions generally include a standard of 
negligence and either an increased-risk or no causation requirement, in addition to an actus reus of 
omission. See supra notes 50–52.  
206 See Damaska, supra note 70, at 480–81.  
207 See Eckhardt, supra note 39, at 18. 
208 See supra Part II.A.2. 
209 See supra Part IV.A. 
210 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 266 (“It is important that the doctrine . . . strike a fair balance 
between imposing criminal liability and denying the commander the necessary freedom to act . . . .”). 
211 Hackel describes a similar phenomenon among enlisted Marines who served in Iraq. It was 
common for any soldier or Marine who had engaged in a firefight to have undergone an investigation 
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Amplifying this apprehension with near-strict liability for law-of-war 
violations may prove too much. Junior leaders may ultimately decide that 
they are “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.” Instead of 
increasing their efforts to prevent war crimes, these leaders may instead opt 
out of the system altogether; the provision will likely hinder the recruitment 
and retention of small-unit commanders. Regrettably, the military struggled 
to retain talented junior leaders as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars carried 
on.212 Considering the vital role they play in COIN operations, the costs of 
near-strict liability could prove overwhelming and degrade the military’s 
overall effectiveness. So, although there is some benefit to a senior-
commander-focused statute (reaching all commanders), the marginal costs 
are likely too high to make it worthwhile. 
If a command responsibility provision is to be incorporated within the 
UCMJ, a more principled approach is to draft a provision that focuses on 
the costs and benefits of each criminal element on small-unit commanders. 
To be sure, this does not necessarily translate into an across-the-board 
increase in the standards of liability.213 It simply calls for the doctrine to be 
evaluated in light of its effects on small-unit commanders. 
There are two likely criticisms of a small-unit leader approach. The 
first is that it assumes most U.S. law-of-war violations occur because “bad 
apples” commit abuses on their own. At least one scholar argues that war 
crimes often occur instead as a result of improper command pressure.214 
Thus, if the doctrine of command responsibility fails to reach the senior 
commanders at the pinnacle of these abuses, it becomes a blunted 
 
following the incident. Such investigations became a constant source of tension and frustration. 
Specifically, Hackel notes that it had “a big impact on your average [Marine] out there. He’s reading 
what’s going on in the news; he’s listening to the media. He doesn’t want to be the guy investigated for 
the next shooting. A lot of the witnesses . . . in all of these cases, all of them say at times [that] if they 
go back, they are a lot more reluctant to pull the trigger on anything.” Hackel, supra note 11, at 262 
(alteration in original) (quoting Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Colonel K. Scott Woodard, Senior 
Def. Counsel, Camp Lejeune, N.C., in Charlottesville, Va. (Jan. 13, 2008)). Similarly, small-unit 
commanders are often weary from being investigated for their command decisions, whether they relate 
to keeping track of equipment, personnel matters, or decisions in combat.  
212 See generally CASEY WARDYNSKI ET AL., TOWARDS A U.S. ARMY OFFICER CORPS STRATEGY 
FOR SUCCESS: RETAINING TALENT (2010), available at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
display.cfm?pubID=965 (addressing the problem of low retention rates for talented junior officers). See 
also David Barno, Op-Ed., Military Brain Drain, FOREIGN POLICY, Feb. 13, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/13/military_brain_drain?page=full (discussing flight of 
talented junior leaders). At the height of the war in Iraq, the Army resorted to offering select captains a 
retention bonus of up to $20,000 in return for additional years of service—an unprecedented offer in 
U.S. Army history. See Jim Tice, O-3s Could Soon Get $20,000 Retention Bonus, ARMY TIMES, Apr. 
30, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/04/army_officer_bonus_070420w. 
213 Indeed, in some cases, a low threshold of culpability is still justifiable under a small-unit leader 
approach. See infra Part V.B.  
214 Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 252–54. 
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preventative tool.215 Examples of such improper pressure include the Abu 
Ghraib scandal and the delayed investigation into the Haditha incident.216 
Even if this argument proves correct, however, a small-unit leader based 
statute would still appropriately address these types of scenarios. In the 
context of Abu Ghraib, the cost of creating a low bar for liability would not 
outweigh the benefits for small-unit commanders. Here, the need to ensure 
that small-unit leaders employ proper interrogation techniques is great.217 
On the other hand, these military intelligence commanders are operating 
within a setting they control—a guarded prison. This differs substantially 
from the leaders who are conducting continuous engagements among the 
local population. With respect to detainee operations then, a small-unit 
commander approach would accommodate a broad scope of liability. 
Furthermore, as outlined below, the same result occurs in the context of 
delayed investigations and potential cover-ups. Strong incentives are 
needed here as well to force all commanders (including junior leaders) to 
report war crimes to their superiors and punish them accordingly in COIN 
environments.218 
The second criticism is that a small-unit commander focus will further 
the impression that senior commanders only suffer “mere wrist slaps” for 
their failures.219 Among legal scholars, there is a general perception that the 
“big fish” generally avoid punishment, while the “small fries” are routinely 
prosecuted for their crimes.220 This notion runs counter to the idea that 
senior commanders are supposed to be the standard bearers for the rest of 
the military. The appearance of invincibility signals that law-of-war 
compliance is only a secondary concern. 
Although the argument carries some weight, it is little reason to shy 
away from a small-unit leader approach. The issue is simply a tradeoff 
between a negative image and an effective enforcement regime. Even if 
senior commanders signal that law-of-war compliance is of little 
importance, an approach focused on small-unit commanders would still 
combat this impression among junior leaders. Moreover, a small-unit leader 
provision could still increase pressure on senior commanders to make law-
of-war compliance a top priority. For instance, if a junior leader were 
forced to stand trial for his command failures, the actions of his superiors 
would likely be brought to light as well.221 If a senior commander wishes to 
 
215 Cf. id. at 257 (discussing how ICTY prosecutors tend to use the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise to convict high-level defendants instead of command responsibility).  
216 For background regarding the Abu Ghraib and Haditha incidents, see supra note 23. Both 
incidents can be seen as “systemic harms.” Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 253.  
217 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 248–54. 
218 See infra Part V.B.  
219 Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 258.  
220 Id. at 256; see also supra note 25. 
221 This point is illustrated in the case of the Kill Team murders. There, senior Army leadership not 
only conducted an investigation into the staged killings, but also conducted a brigade-wide review of 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1416 
avoid a public criticism and rebuke, his conduct must be above reproach. 
Therefore, if Congress were to incorporate a command responsibility 
regime within the UCMJ, the legislature should focus on the potential costs 
and benefits to small-unit commanders. 
V. APPLYING THE SMALL-UNIT COMMANDER THESIS: NEGLIGENCE 
If Congress were to adopt a command responsibility statute focused on 
small-unit leaders, it would have to decide the controversial question of 
whether commanders should be punished for their negligent failures to 
prevent, suppress, or punish war crimes.222 Many formulations of the 
command responsibility doctrine embrace some form of negligence, 
including the ICC statute and Hansen’s proposal.223 Using the small-unit 
leader framework as a guide, however, it becomes clear that negligence 
should only retain a limited role. 
A negligent command failure encompasses two ideas. It may mean 
that a commander knows of an imminent crime, but negligently fails to take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish the act.224 It may 
also refer to a commander who is unaware a crime is imminent (or is 
occurring), but whose ignorance is a direct result of negligence.225 Although 
both forms of liability are important, the latter is the real subject of debate. 
Many commentators argue that punishing commanders who should have 
known about law-of-war violations constitutes the core of the doctrine.226 
The ICC and Hansen are also in agreement on this point. Under the 
Rome Statute, liability is assessed against a military commander who 
“either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known 
that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.”227 
Similarly, under Hansen’s Model Penal Code formulation, “[a] military 
commander acts negligently . . . when he should be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that forces under his effective command and control 
will commit, are committing, or have committed such war crimes.”228 
As illustrated above, establishing command responsibility on this basis 
comes dangerously close to establishing strict liability for small-unit 
 
leadership and discipline. See Assmann, supra note 92. Although this report remains classified, the 
information within has a better chance of being released to the public if a command responsibility trial 
were initiated. 
222 See Hansen, supra note 25, at 403 (identifying mens rea as “the thorniest issue” of command 
responsibility). 
223 See Rome Statute, supra note 52; Hansen, supra note 19, at 269. 
224 MELONI, supra note 14, at 200.  
225 Id. at 202.  
226 Id. at 201–02; see also O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 142–43.  
227 Rome Statute, supra note 52 (emphasis added). 
228 Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 (emphasis added). 
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commanders.229 These penalties would draw a commander’s attention 
toward law-of-war compliance, but the question is whether they reach too 
far.230 When considering the effects of a negligence standard upon small-
unit commanders, the answer is mixed. In the context of failures to prevent 
war crimes, a negligence regime proves unproductive. Conversely, when 
dealing with negligent failures to punish (or report) a war crime, it becomes 
more constructive. 
A. Negligent Failures to Prevent War Crimes 
When prosecuting a commander for failing to prevent a war crime, it is 
not necessary that the commander should have been aware of the details of 
the specific crime.231 If this were the case, the doctrine would be stripped of 
its potency and would apply only to commanders with actual knowledge.232 
A commander would have to actually witness the crime unfold or have a 
detailed report of the scheme. 
Modern formulations of the doctrine instead require that a commander 
be aware of the risk that some war crime will occur within his ranks.233 
Using Staff Sergeant Bales’s superior as an example, his liability would 
depend upon how likely it was for Bales to seek retribution against the 
local civilian population. If the risk was substantial and unjustifiable,234 or 
if the circumstances indicated a potential risk,235 then the superior is 
punishable. In order to avoid liability in this situation, a commander must 
continuously assess whether or not his soldiers are in danger of committing 
war crimes. This means practically that leaders must understand what 
constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute or War Crimes Act of 1996 
and evaluate the risk of each occurring within his ranks. In short, then, 
adopting a negligence standard transforms law-of-war compliance into an 
exercise in risk assessment. 
1. Transforming Law of War into Risk Assessment:  
Benefits.—Requiring commanders to evaluate the risk of war 
crimes (i.e., adopting a negligence standard) is not necessarily a bad result. 
It provides incentives for all commanders to actually study the list of 
applicable war crimes and understand the elements of each. This is 
important because current lower-level commanders tend to lack a working 
 
229 See Damaska, supra note 70, at 480–81. 
230 See Wu & Kang, supra note 13, at 281 (suggesting due process concerns would undermine the 
legitimacy of a conviction based on strict liability principles given the severity of the punishment).  
231 See MELONI, supra note 14, at 188–89.  
232 See id.  
233 See id. at 189 (“[W]hat triggers the superior’s duty to act is the knowledge . . . of the risk of 
commission of crimes by subordinates.” (alteration in original)). 
234 Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 app. 
235 Rome Statute, supra note 52.  
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knowledge of many important aspects of the law of land warfare.236 
Instead, these leaders frequently understand only a few important law-of-
war issues—namely, those that are listed in the theater’s rules of 
engagement.237 The provision would incentivize small-unit commanders to 
understand the complete list of applicable crimes. 
Turning law-of-war violation prevention into an exercise in risk 
assessment is also beneficial because commanders are already familiar with 
the concept.238 A commander is required to conduct risk assessment prior to 
any mission or training event.239 This exercise asks him to consider all 
conceivable hazards his soldiers may face during a mission and plan ahead 
in an attempt to mitigate these dangers.240 For example, prior to Lieutenant 
Ligsay’s visit to the village La Mohammad Kalay, he would have been 
required to assess such risks as the potential for ambush along the route, 
weather effects on his soldiers, or a possible communications breakdown 
during the mission. A negligence standard seeks to add an additional 
consideration to the matrix by asking commanders to assess the potential 
that their soldiers will inflict criminal injury on others. To be sure, Army 
doctrine already requires a commander to consider the effects of his 
mission on the civilian population (i.e., noncombatants).241 But this form of 
command responsibility would highlight war crimes for special 
consideration. 
2. Transforming Law of War into Risk Assessment:  
Drawbacks.—Despite the benefits of including potential law-of-
war violations in small-unit commanders’ routine risk assessment 
procedures, a problem occurs when a commander actually works through 
the analysis. Normally when a commander encounters a risk he must 
answer two questions: (1) How likely is the risk’s occurrence?; and (2) 
What are the adverse effects of the risk?242 The latter inquiry is relatively 
 
236 Although all military personnel are required to receive training on the laws of war, the subject is 
generally taught to junior leaders only during entry-level training schools and other intermittent 
leadership courses. See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, LAW OF WAR TRAINING: 
RESOURCES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS 29 (2008), available at http://www.usip.org/
publications/law-of-war-training-resources-military-and-civilian-leaders. 
237 Every soldier is required to know the rules of engagement in effect in his area of operation (e.g., 
Afghanistan or Iraq) and keep a copy with him while deployed. See FM 7-21.13, supra note 136, paras. 
5-117 to -118. 
238 See generally U.S DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 5-19, COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT (21 
Aug. 2006) [hereinafter FM 5-19] (discussing the application of composite risk management to the 
military decision-making process). 
239 Id. para. 1-0 (Composite Risk Management “is a continuous process applied across the full 
spectrum of Army training and operations . . . .”).  
240 See id. paras. 1-2 to -44 (describing the five-step Composite Risk Management process).  
241 See id. paras. 1-17 to -18 (discussing how civilian considerations are part of the standard format 
for identifying mission hazards).  
242 See id. paras. 1-22 (laying out the “three substeps” of Composite Risk Management).  
108:1385 (2014) Command Responsibility 
1419 
straightforward—war crimes have a devastating effect on the local 
population and hinder a unit’s ability to operate within that local area. 
Instead, the real challenge is in assessing the likelihood that a war crime 
will occur. 
Assessing the likelihood of a war crime is problematic for two reasons. 
First, there is little consensus on what factors to consider when evaluating 
the risk of a subordinate committing a war crime. Second, even if there 
were, there is little agreement as to when a risk becomes so great that it 
demands action from the commander. In light of these pitfalls, it is 
counterproductive to hold small-unit commanders responsible on the basis 
of negligence unless they have strong incentives to shun their law-of-war 
duties. 
The first problem with using risk assessment in the context of war 
crimes is that there is little agreement as to what factors should be used 
when weighing the degree of risk. The Rome Statute asks what a 
commander should have known “owing to the circumstances at the 
time.”243 Although Hansen’s proposal does not use this language, it uses a 
reasonably prudent commander standard to assess negligence.244 Under this 
approach, prudence depends on the circumstances at hand as well. 
But the question becomes: Which circumstances are relevant when 
considering the risk of war crimes? Certainly intelligence about a potential 
crime is relevant,245 even if it is just rumors. If Lieutenant Ligsay had 
received a report or overheard rumblings that his subordinates were 
planning to stage a killing, that should have factored into his assessment. 
Yet there are a number of other factors Lieutenant Ligsay could have also 
considered, such as: his soldiers’ level of training, particularly with respect 
to the laws of war; their attitude toward noncombatants; their personal 
issues, past misconduct, and general compliance with basic standards of 
discipline; and his unit’s reputation.246 Furthermore, in light of the Staff 
Sergeant Bales massacre, one might also include a subordinate’s mental 
health on this list.247 Each of these is a plausible indicator that a subordinate 
is likely to commit a war crime in the future. There has been little effort, 
however, to determine which of these factors commanders should be 
required to assess.248 
 
243 See Rome Statute, supra note 52 (emphasis added); see also MELONI, supra note 14, at 185.  
244 See Hansen, supra note 19, at 273 app. 
245 MELONI, supra note 14, at 185. 
246 These are drawn from the facts as outlined in Part II.A.1. 
247 See supra Part II.A.2. 
248 Hansen offers an opinion on what should constitute a relevant circumstance: 
[T]he level of training and experience of the forces under his command; the severity and duration 
of past combat operations that involved his forces; the nature of the mission; the availability of 
other forces who may be at a higher state of readiness and competence; the existence of specific 
orders from a higher authority; and the overall morale of the forces under his command. 
Hansen, supra note 25, at 408. However, there is no consensus on the issue. 
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Even if there is agreement on what constitutes a relevant warning sign, 
commanders may not be particularly adept at judging how particular 
circumstances fit together. They may not be able to accurately assess a 
mixture of positive and negative indicators. Consider the perspective of the 
following commander. He knows that his subordinate, Private Snuffy, 
refers to local Afghans as “savages” and is having problems with his family 
back home. At the same time, Private Snuffy is a professional soldier who 
knows his rules of engagement and has never acted out while on mission. 
How could the commander know whether Private Snuffy is likely to 
commit a war crime? As this simple example illustrates, a commander is 
forced to make an assessment he may be ill equipped to handle.249 
The second major problem with utilizing risk assessment is that 
commanders do not have notice as to what degree of risk triggers the 
potential for liability. When assessing the likelihood of a hazard, 
commanders normally classify risks as either low, medium, high, or 
extremely high.250 Commentators have given little consideration, however, 
to where the line should be drawn for establishing liability. Does a 
commander have to identify a low, medium, high, or extremely high risk of 
a war crime before his failure to take reasonable preventative measures 
gives rise to criminal liability? There is always some level of risk that war 
crimes are about to be committed, even after a commander takes steps to 
mitigate them.251 The problem lies in identifying what constitutes an 
acceptable level of risk. Because it is difficult to distinguish between an 
acceptable and substantial level of risk in the midst of war, commanders 
should be afforded the benefit of a more lenient mental standard. 
 
 * *  * 
 
In light of these considerations, adopting a negligent failure to prevent 
form of command responsibility is counterproductive. It is ultimately too 
difficult for commanders to assess the likelihood of a crime and the degree 
of risk that a crime will occur. It is inadvisable to allow command 
responsibility to turn on such uncertain determinations. The main benefit of 
a negligence regime is that it incentivizes commanders to expand their 
 
249 Simply holding Private Snuffy back from a mission is not likely the easy solution to this 
problem. Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely faced issues regarding depleted manpower. 
See, e.g., Josh White, A Shortage of Troops in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, July 3, 2008, at A1, available 
at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-07-03/world/36841792_1_afghanistan-troops-sufficient-
forces. 
250 These are the four levels of risk recognized by Army leaders. See FM 5-19, supra note 238, 
para. 1-22, fig.1-4. 
251 One method for mitigating future violations is to review law-of-war concepts with soldiers 
during a pre-mission safety brief or the orders issuing process. 
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knowledge on the laws of war. That benefit, which can be achieved through 
other means, does not outweigh its costs to small-unit commanders. 
B. Negligent Failures to Punish War Crimes 
The failure to punish form of command responsibility provides a 
different set of incentives for commanders. Whereas the preventative prong 
is about risk assessment and identifying warning signs, the punishment 
prong is meant to create incentives for commanders to investigative 
incidents and prevent cover-ups.252 The inquiry into a commander’s failure 
to punish usually revolves around what reporting systems he had in place 
and how closely he looked into the matter.253 
Although punishing negligent failures to prevent is counterproductive, 
holding commanders liable for negligent failures to punish may be still 
appropriate. The difference lies in the preexisting incentives that are 
created by COIN warfare. Whereas commanders already have ample 
incentives to prevent crimes in order to avoid public backlash, there are 
negative incentives for commanders to report crimes once they occur.254 
For example, if a commander can keep an incident discreet, he can avoid a 
potentially deadly outcry against his unit.255 Because of the pressure to keep 
quiet, any command responsibility regime should provide maximum 
incentives for both small-unit and higher-level leaders to hold their 
subordinates responsible for violations of the laws of war. Thus, adopting a 
standard of negligence is more appropriate for failures to punish than for 
preventative failures. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the U.S. military has recognized the concept of command 
responsibility for over sixty years, it remains a dormant criminal doctrine. 
The U.S. military instead relies mostly on administrative and nonjudicial 
means to punish leaders who fail to ensure that their soldiers comply with 
the laws of war. Many commentators assert that stronger incentives are 
needed to prevent future war crimes. But as scholars seek to create stronger 
measures and codify command responsibility, they must keep small-unit 
commanders in mind. Lower-level leaders are not only the best resource for 
preventing and reporting war crimes; they are the keys to success in COIN 
operations. Any codified form of command responsibility must strike a 
delicate balance to ensure that small-unit commanders focus on law-of-war 
compliance while still operating freely. 
 
252 See Sepinwall, supra note 21, at 259–60. 
253 See MELONI, supra note 14, at 202–04. 
254 See FM 3-24, supra note 76, app. paras. D-23 to -24. 
255 Hackel, supra note 11, at 240–41 (describing the rise in violence after the initial reports of Abu 
Ghraib scandal). 
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The increasing importance of small-unit leaders makes clear that some 
basic notions of command responsibility need to be rethought before 
formalizing the doctrine in domestic law. As the focus on small-unit 
leaders demonstrates, a negligence standard does not always lead to 
optimal solutions, despite its widespread support. Perhaps, if the time 
comes, a small-unit leader approach will provide a framework that will 
help jurists and military leaders agree on how best to draft a widely 
accepted U.S. provision. 
 
